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In the science and technology policy literature that emerged in the early 1980s it was generally held, while pub lic support for science is appropriate, that public support for technology development is an unproductive use of public resources. Skepticism of the government role in technology development was not limited to critics from the right; critics from the left increasingly shared this view. This negative view was captured in the title of the book by Cohen and Noll (eds.) , The Technology Pork Barrel (Brookings 1991) .
The view that emerges from my recent book, Technology Growth and Development (Oxford 2001 ) is quite different. It is consistent with a newer literature on technology oriented research and development as a public good (Stiglitz 1999; David Hall and Toole 2000; Dalrymple 2002) . It is also consistent with an older historical literature on science and government (Dupree 1957; . Government has played an important role in technology development and transfer in almost every U.S. industry that has become competitive on a global scale.
In this paper I trace the role of government in technical change in three of the general purpose technologies that I studied in preparing Technology, Growth and Development-the electric light and power, the computer, and the biotechnology industries. 1 The electric light and power industry was a dynamic source of economic growth in the first half of the 20 th century; the computer and related information technologies played a similar role in the second half of the century; and the biotechnology industries seem poised to become the dynamic source of economic growth during the first half of the 21 st century.
In tracing the sources of technology development in the several general purpose technologies I find it necessary to consider the institutional innovations associated with technology development. I employ an induced innovation perspective in which both technical and institutional change are induced by changes (and differences) in relative resource endowments and prices (Hayami and Ruttan 1970; Ruttan and Hayami 1984; Ruttan 2001a: 100-146) . I also employ a much more complex view of the relationship between advances in scientific and technical knowledge and the role of the public and private sectors in advancing scientific and technical knowledge than the simple linear model that has dominated the early post
World War II science and technology policy literature (Fig. 1 ).
ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER
The electric light and power industry represents a partial qualification to my generalization in that government has played an important role in technology development and transfer in almost every industry that has become competitive on a global scale. The initial role of the public sector was in the area of institutional innovation, in what came to be termed the Insull System. The role of the public sector in the development of atomic power after World War II has provided important fuel to the critics of the involvement of the public sector in technology development (Cohen and Noll 1991) .
The First American Industrial Laboratory 2
The inventions that lead to electric power technology were supported entirely by the private sector. But the development of electrical technology drew substantially on prior scientific research. "The lexicon of electricity-ohms, amperes, galvanometers, hertz, volts-is a gallery of great scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Ausubel and Marchetti 1977: 111) .
The first American industrial research laboratory in the modern sense was established by Prior to establishing his Menlo Park laboratory Edison had been responsible for a number of important inventions, the most important being in the area of telegraphy. In the early 1870s
Edison established a factory in Newark, New Jersey to manufacture telegraphic equipment for Western Union. At Newark Edison began to assemble the research and development team that would become the core group for his Menlo Park laboratory (Reich 1985: 42-45) . He visualized the Menlo Park facility as an "invention factory"-capable of turning out "a minor invention every ten days and a big thing every six months or so." He chose the Menlo Park location because it would provide insulation from the distractions of the Newark urban environment.
Edison was a compulsive worker who often worked and slept in his laboratory for several days at a time, and he expected the same dedication from his staff.
In 1878, two years after moving to Menlo Park, Edison began to focus his efforts on the development and introduction of a system of electric lighting. On October 20, 1878 he announced in the New York Sun a plan for underground distribution of electricity from centrally located generators. At the time of his announcement Edison had no generator, no promising incandescent lamp, and no system of distribution. A major problem that had to be solved was the invention and development of a high-resistance filament for the incandescent light. On the basis of careful economic calculations Edison determined that a high-resistance lamp filament, in contrast to the low-resistance one tried by earlier inventors of incandescent lamps, should be necessary to compete economically with gas lights.
These calculations did not, however, lead directly to a selection of an appropriate filament. Edison and his assistants found it necessary to test over 3000 different materials, including platinum and bamboo, before finally settling on carbonized cotton thread, Hughes, notes that "Edison's method of inventions and development in the case of the electric light system was a blend of economics, technology (especially experimentation), and science. In his notebooks pages of economic calculations are mixed with pages reporting experimental data . . . and hypothesis formulation based on science" (Hughes 1979: 135 
Institutional Innovation
The initial role of the public sector in the electric power and light industry involved the development of an integrated, technically efficient, monopolistic and publicly regulated system of delivering electric power. This system, known as the Insull System, was first achieved in Chicago. Samuel Insull had served his apprenticeship with Edison at Melno Park and at the Edison General Electric Company in Schenectady.
At the age of 32 Insull moved to Chicago to become president of the Chicago Edison
Company. The system that Insull created in Chicago became a model for the public utility industry. The development of a publicly regulated system capable of providing a dependable supply of electric power at acceptable prices to consumers and reasonable returns to inventors required the mobilization of substantial political resources. Methods were found by which politicians "obtained wealth from political power without having to steal public money" (Hughes 1983: 206) .
The result was an implicit social contract in which the utilities undertook to provide reliable and affordable electricity in exchange for a socially determined rate of return. This system remained intact until the 1970's when it was confronted by a maturing technology, raising costs of primary energy, rapid growth of nuclear power, and the emergence of an aggressive environmental movement (Hirsh and Serchuk 1996) . The effect of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, designed to encourage competition and deregulation in the electrical utility industry, induced the deconstruction of the integrated system that Samuel Insull and other leaders of the electric power industry had established in the 1920's.
Premature Commercialization of Nuclear Power 3
In the period immediately after World War II it was anticipated that nuclear energy would largely replace fossil fuels as the primary fuel source in the generation of electricity. The prospect of developing a peaceful use for nuclear energy generated considerable enthusiasm in both the scientific community and the general public. It was asserted that nuclear energy would make electricity so inexpensive that it would be "too cheap to meter" (Pool 1997: 71 States, and later in Germany and Japan, large public R&D programs were complemented by substantial private research investment by firms such as Westinghouse, General Electric, Babcox and Wilcox, Siemens, AEG, and Mitsubishi. In the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.S.R., the research was conducted almost exclusively by the public sector. Nowhere were the electric utility firms heavily involved in nuclear research. They assumed that replacing a fossil fuel-fired boiler with a nuclear reactor to produce steam would be a relatively simple process-"a nuclear reactor was just another way to boil water."
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The anticipated economies of scale and cost reductions from "learning by doing" and "learning by using" were not realized, however. They were more than offset by increases in the complexity of reactors, due partly to initial design errors, but largely to increasingly stringent safety standards. In many cases, final costs exceeded initial estimates by 100%. 6 It became apparent by the mid-1970s that the simple and comparatively inexpensive light-water reactors of the late 1960s were, partly on engineering grounds and partly due to safety concerns, no longer commercially viable (MacKerron 1992; 1994 decade. These higher capital costs pushed the cost of producing electricity from nuclear-fueled plants even higher relative to coal-burning plants. As electrical shortages began to emerge in the 1980s, utilities increasingly turned to natural gas as a source of primary energy because plants could be brought on line relatively quickly, even though cost per kilowatt hour might be higher than for either nuclear power or coal (Ruttan 2002: 278, 279) .
A Faustian Bargain?
In an important paper published in 1972 Alvin M. Weinberg, a leading atomic scientist and director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, anticipated many of the problems that have constrained the development of the nuclear power industry. 'We nuclear people have made a
Faustian bargain with society. On the one hand we offer the catalytic nuclear burner-an inexhaustible source of energy. Even in the short range, when we use ordinary reactors, we offer energy that is cheaper than fossil fuel. Moreover, this source of fuel, when properly handled, is almost nonpolluting. But the price we demand of society for this manageable energy source is both a vigilance and a longevity in our social institutions that we are quite unaccustomed to" (Weinberg 1972: 33 French developed capabilities in all areas of the nuclear power cycle, from reactor design and construction to fuel supplies and waste treatment.
Renewable Energy
It has been apparent for more than a decade that if renewable sources of primary energy were to make a substantial contribution to national energy supply during the early decades of the 21 st century that sustained public support would be required (Grubb 1993; Johansson, Kelly and Williams 1993: World Energy Council 1994: 48-52) . The limited commercial suc cess that renewable sources such as biomass, wind, solar-thermal, and photovoltaic have achieved has reflected both the limited public support for research and development of these technologies and to lack of support by regulatory regimes. As a result the U.S. has lagged relative to Japan and Germany in the development and installation of photovoltaic systems, behind Denmark in cogeneration system deployment and Canada in the development of fuel-cell systems (Herzog, Lipman, Edwards, and Kammen 2001) .
A number of potential benefits not captured by conventional project investment criteria were advanced in favor of renewable energy sources. These include (1) reduced air pollution, (2) abatement of global warming, (3) diversity of fuel supply, (4) reduction in the risks of nuclear proliferation, (5) restoration of degraded lands, and (6) contribution to decentralized regional development (Johansson et al. 1993: 4) . If electricity based on renewable resources is preferred because of these environmental and related benefits, the policy interventions required will include (1) reduction or removal of subsidies to artificially lower the costs of fossil and nuclear fuels, (2) design of policy instruments that ensure that environmental and other external costs are more adequately reflected in energy prices, and (3) stronger public support for research and demonstration of renewable energy technologies. Support for such policy intervention has declined in the U.S. and in most other major industrial countries compared to the 1980s and early 1990s (Dooley 1998; Margolis and Kammen 1999; Herzog, Lipman, Edwards, and Kammen 2001) .
THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
The computer, semiconductor, and software industries were initially strongly nourished by the Government contracts played a critical role in the development of IBM's capacity to market a fully transistorized commercial computer, the IBM 7090 (Usselman 1993) . In the early 1950s IBM became involved in a U.S.-Canadian cooperative effort to build a computerized air defense system, the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE). SAGE was designed to detect alien aircraft, select appropriate interceptor aircraft, and determine antiaircraft missile trajectories. The system had to store and process large amounts of information and coordinate several computers in real-time mode. The success of the SAGE project led to a number of important developments that resulted in lower costs and improved performance.
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In 1952 the Justice Department filed an antitrust suit against IBM over its policy of only leasing its tabulating machines, monopolization of the punch card market, and price discrimination in punch card sales. But government policy, by also supporting IBM research and development, was operating at cross purposes. In 1956 IBM agreed to a consent decree resolving the antitrust suit. The IBM strategy was to forego dominance in the mature tabulating equipment and card markets and pursue dominance in the computer market. The contracts with the Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission contributed substantially to the realization of the IBM strategy (Jorgensen 1996) .
The transistor, invented in 1947, emerged out of research by the solid-state research group, led by William Shockley, at the Bell Telephone Laboratories. Although the transistor is sometimes cited as an example of a "science push" invention, a clear demand-side need for such a device was apparent at Bell Laboratories. The solid-state research program was initiated and sustained in an effort to find an alternative to the vacuum tubes used in telephone switchboards.
The first integrated circuits were developed at Texas Instruments and Fairchild Semiconductor in an effort to repackage semiconductor products (transistors, resistors, and capacitors) as single components to reduce circuit interconnections (Ruttan 2001: 321-325) Although the development of the transistor and integrated circuits had been initially financed by the private sector demand for semiconductors was almost completely dominated by procurement for military and aerospace applications until the early 1960's (Levin 1987 ).
Computer Software
Prior to the 1960s computer software hardly existed as a distinct technology or industry.
"Software was effectively born with the development by von Neumann of his conceptual architecture for computers. . . . But even after the von Neumann scheme became dominant . . . software remained closely bound to hardware. During the 1950s, the organization designing the hardware generally designed the software as well" (Langlois and Mowery 1996: 55-56) . A comprehensive treatment of the computer software (and services) industry would require a separate paper. But because of its intimate relationship to the development and diffusion of the computer-computer hardware cannot be used without software-it will be useful to identify some of the main developments and structural characteristics of the software industry.
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These events were induced by several very special economic characteristics of software production. Software deve lopment is very labor intensive. But the cost of reproduction of software is very low or negligible relative to the cost of software development. 12 Furthermore, as software uses expanded to meet the needs of the complex U.S. economy, the ability of comp uter producers to understand and solve the specific software problems faced by the variety of industries that use information technology is limited. Thus the growth of an independent software industry contributed to the growth in demand for computers.
Three events in the mid and late 1960s contributed to the "disintegration" of the computer and software industries (Steinmueller 1996: 24-26 programming language for Apple, Commodore, and Radio Shack. Users could write their own applications in BASIC rather than buying packaged applications. "Microsoft's strategy was to get computer companies to buy licenses to include our software with the personal computers they sold and pay us a royalty" (Gates 1995: 11) . By 1979, Microsoft BASIC had become the industry standard. The firm concentrated on writing programming languages for the profusion of new machines that were appearing (Gates 1995: 43, 44 ).
When IBM finally became committed to building a personal computer in 1980 it decided to buy its microprocessors from Intel and to license its operating system from Microsoft rather than creating software itself. Microsoft in turn bought an operating system for the Intel 8088 16-bit microprocessor from another Seattle software computer and hired its top engineer, Tim
Patterson. After substantial modification it became the Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS). IBM called the system PC-DOS. "We gave IBM a fabulous deal-a low, one-time fee that granted the company the right to use Microsoft's operating system on as many computers as it could sell. This offered IBM an incentive to push MS-DOS and to sell it inexpensively. . . .
Our goal was not to make money directly from IBM, but to profit from licensing MS-DOS to computer companies that wanted to offer machines more or less compatible with the IBM-PC" (Gates 1995: 49) . Within a few years almost all the competing standards for personal computers disappeared. The only successful exceptions were Apple II and Macintosh.
Mowery (1996, (9) (10) (11) has argued that the U.S. software industry represents a classic case of "lock-in" resulting from the interaction of industry standards and "network externalities".
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Once "first-mover" advantage was established by Microsoft, consumer choice among competing producers was influenced by the number of other adopters. The emergence of the IBM PC architecture as a "dominant design" further reinforced Microsoft's dominance as a supplier of PC operating systems. Mowery also argues that first-mover network externalities were a primary reason for continued segmentation of the software industry structure. It has been difficult for firms that have achieved dominance in one specific industry segment (such as spreadsheets) to successfully enter other segments (such as word processing or databases). By the late 1990s, however, it appeared that Microsoft might be in the process of breaking this historical pattern. At the time this paper was written the software industry, fueled both by continuing hardware development and by expanding access to the Internet, was in the process of rapid evolution. The Internet itself involved the transformation of a computer network (ARPANET) established in the 1960s by DARPA. For its first decade the Internet was conceived primarily as a way for scientific workers to exchange data and work closely together without leaving their laboratories (Norberg and O'Neill 1996) . By the late 1990s, however, both the private sector and the government are attempting to achieve control, for commercial and security purposes, of a system that was originally designed to be uncontrollable (Saco 1996; Hughes 1998: 255-300) .
Inventing the Internet Processor (IMP). Both the development of the software, which would route message blocks of "packages" through alternative connections, and the engineering design problems turned out to be much more difficult than anticipated. But the "IMP guys" succeeded in completing development of the basic ele ments of the Internet nine months after the contract had been let.
In his assessment of the accomplishments of the "IMP guys" Thomas Hughes insisted:
"Future historians, fully aware of the remarkable development of the worldwide Internet, following hard upon the path-breaking ARP ANET, may some day compare the inventive success of the small BBN group to the achievement of Thomas Edison and his small band of associates who invented the electric lighting system" (Hughes 1998: 278) . As in the case of Edison's research at Menlo Park there was an intense dialectical interaction between advances in science and technology. Sometimes invention was informed by science and at other times invention came first followed by scientific insight.
Hughes also regards the flat management structure of the ARPANET project as an important institutional innovation. It stood in sharp contrast to the "command and control" The invention of the Cohen-Boyer "gene splicing" technique opened up the possibility of "engineering" the genetics of a cell to induce it to produce a specific protein that might, for example, have pharmaceutical or agronomic value. These and related scientific advances opened up a period of wild optimism about the possibilities of commercial development.
The University -Industrial Complex
Prior to the mid-1970s almost all research in molecular biology, including the three major breakthroughs, and biotechnology had been conducted by universities and funded by foundations and the federal government. An important motivation for the very substantial growth in federal funding of research in molecular genetics was its potential contribution to solving health problems. 16 Solving health problems through biological research was more consistent with
American political philosophy than a more direct attack on the social and institutional sources of ill health.
When the prospects for commercial exploitation of biotechnology became apparent, it also became obvious that the capacity to conduct the necessary research and development resided almost entirely in the universities and in a few federal laboratories. In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a period of intense entrepreneurial activity in the formation of new university-industry relationships. The pioneers in molecular biology were thrust into a role they had not anticipated-the role of entrepreneurs in the new biotechnology industries.
Science Entrepreneurs
Many of the early genetic engineering companies were founded or co-founded by academic researchers. The commercially oriented research was initially undertaken in university laboratories. Even when the new start-up companies were able to provide their own laboratory space, many entrepreneur-scientists preferred, and were permitted, to retain their university appointments. (Kenney 1986: 94, 95) . As the biotechnology industry has matured, the role of academic researchers as entrepreneurs has receded.
The problem faced by Genentech, and every other genetic engineering start-up company, was how to secure sufficient income during the early years to maintain its research program.
Genentech attempted to solve this problem by contracting to perform research and development services for major drug companies. The first contract that Genentech entered into was to provide genetically engineered insulin-producing bacteria to Eli Lilly, the leading producer of insulin.
Under the contract with Lilly, Genentech was paid to conduct the research and was granted a royalty on all sales of Lilly's bacterially produced insulin. Lilly received exclusive worldwide rights to manufacture and market the insulin.
The pattern followed by Genentech was repeated many times. The potential analogy with the dramatic profits realized by early start-up firms in the computer and software industries became an almost irresistible lure for venture capitalists. Three important ingredients for starting a biotechnology firm in the late 1970s were a university scientist who had command of the knowledge and techniques, an entrepreneur with good connections in the academic and financial communities, and financial backers who could be convinced that the business would develop a successful commercial product within 5 to 7 years. It was also helpful if one or two Nobel awardees in the field of molecular genetics could be attracted to the board of the new company. It is hard to escape the conclusion that a few "delusion genes" were also important! Industrial Organization
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By the early 1980s a new pattern of relationships involving the establishment of formal institutional arrangements between universities, research institutes, and multinational pharmaceutical and chemical companies emerged. This new pattern represented an effort by large pharmaceutical companies to obtain access to capacity in the field of molecular genetics that they had neglected to develop their own laboratories. This close linkage between scientific advances and commercially useful innovations made prompt acquisition of such capacity an important source of competitive advantage. These new arrangements were sought by universities because of a perception tha t public funding would be much more difficult to come by than in the past. They were favored by faculty who were not unhappy to be relieved of the burden of continuous grant seeking. In these arrangements the funding corporation obtained access to not only the research skills of the principal investigator but, in some cases, to an entire laboratory or department, including assistant professors, postdoctoral researchers, and graduate students (Ruttan 2001: 379-384) .
During the early 1980s large university-industry biotechnology research contracts were entered into by a number of major universities and research institutes and corporations. The first of these, and a model for several others, was between Massachusetts General Hospital, the primary teaching and research hospital for Harvard Medical School, and Hoechst, a
German-based multinational chemical company. The details of the proposed arrangements between Hoechst and Harvard became pub lic when Congressman Albert Gore raised questions about the propriety of "selling" the research investment, paid for by American taxpayers, to a foreign company. The final contract was rewritten to take into account some of the objections raised by Gore, particularly the coupling of federal and private funds. It is clear that Hoechst purchased more than "a window on the technology." It purchased the opportunity to build a cadre of researchers trained in a first rate laboratory in "state-of-the-art genetic engineering techniques" (Kenney 1986: 63) .
A 1982 contract between Washington University (St. Louis) and Monsanto raised even more questions than the Harvard-Hoechst contract. The Washington University-Monsanto contract provided Monsanto with access to the entire Washington University Medical School. Its primary emphasis was on the development of new products with potential commercial value. The contract provided that the financial gains from the project would accrue not to the individual investigator, but rather to the institution, the particular department in the Medical School, and to the specific laboratory responsible for the creative effort.
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By the mid-1980s the system of industrial organization in the biotechnology industries had changed very substantially from a decade earlier, when almost all drug-related R&D had been conducted in-house by the major pharmaceutical and agrochemical companies Garnbardella 1990: 1994) . The innovation process now depended on three types of agents:
university and government laboratories, small-and medium-sized biotechnology firms, and large pharmaceutical and agrochemical companies. Three factors have led to an intimate and complex set of relationships among these agents. The first is that in biotechnology the relationship between scientific advances and technical development often has been relatively direct. The second is that even the largest pharmaceutical and agrochemical firms found it difficult or excessively expensive to internalize all the resources necessary to invent and develop new biotechnologies. The third was the system of incentives resulting from the Bay-Dale Act (1980) and a series of related acts whereby universities and private firms can claim property rights to technology based on publicly funded research.
The major assets of the new biotechnology firms were their close articulation with university basic research in molecular biology, their tacit know-how in applied laboratory research, and the enthusiasm and energy of their scientific entrepreneurs. The product of this research is typically highly specific-a new protein obtained from a genetically engineered organism, for example. The synthesis of a new protein, however, does not complete the process.
Engineering know-how is required to scale up from the laboratory bench to manufacturing.
Familiarity with clinical testing procedures and with the regulatory process is also essential.
Finally, an extensive distribution network is necessary to successfully bring new products to the market. These are capacities that universities and new biotechnology firms did not have and that are very costly to acquire. Cooperative relations between universities, the new biotechnology firms, and the larger pharmaceutical and agrochemical firms proved to be advantageous for the development and commercialization of new biotechnolo gy products.
It is not possible to fully assess the relative contributions of public and private sector research to biotechnology based advances in pharmaceutical and agriculture product development. It is clear, however, that neither the public nor the private sector could have achieved as much as quickly without substantial contributions from the other (Eisenberg and Nelson 2002: 98) . During the 1990s these relationships became even more complex as patent law has struggled to respond to the problem of establishing intellectual property rights to living organisms. 20 Claims to patent rights on fundamental discoveries has further blurred the traditional distribution between public and private knowledge and has imposed increasingly substantial transaction costs on bringing agricultural and pharmaceutical genetically engineered products to the market (Merges and Nelson 1990; Eisenberg and Nelson 2002) .
As this paper was being completed a number of other issues remained unresolved. In the insisted that public research funding is necessary to assure that proteomic knowledge is widely shared (Hamilton and Regaldo 2001) My own sense is that the status of the development the biotechnology industries in the early twenty first century is roughly analogous to that of the computer and related information technology industries in the early 1960's. Until the trajectory of scientific and technical development becomes clearer it is important that the public sector remain heavily involved in both scientific research and technology development.
SOME LESSONS
Several generalizations about the role of the public sector in technology development emerge from the research on which this paper is based (Ruttan 2001) The first is that government has played an important, but different, role in almost every close articulation between the public sector suppliers and the private sector users of the knowledge and technology. Agricultural research has been a highly successful example (Nelson and Langlois 1983: 814-818) .
A second lesson from U.S. experience is the importance of a decentralized public-private national research system. The structure of the U.S. national research system took its present form in the half century between 1880 and 1930. This period witnessed the formation of scientific and technical bureaus within the federal government, the establishment of industrial research laboratories, the formation and growth of public and private research universities, and the emergence of philanthropic foundations to support research and education. These institutions drew on each other for their entrepreneurship and leadership. This decentralized structure has given the United States greater capacity to adjust to changing national and global priorities, and to direct research to the exploration of commercial opportunities, than in countries in which government-funded research is conducted primarily in national laboratories or research institutes only marginally linked with universities and in which private sector research is limited primarily to large firms (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998: 11-46) .
A third generalization is that the premature forcing, by the political system, of a science based technology has often been counterproductive. The development of technology for production of nuclear power is an important example. It is almost certain, however, that changes in energy resource endowments and environmental concerns will induce the scientific and technical effort to develop an environmentally benign nuclear energy technology. It also seems clear that the commercial development of alternative renewable energy sources will occur only as a result of very substantial public funding for technology development ( preeminence on a select number of fields and to perform at a world-class level in other major fields." At a time when the linkages between advances in scientific knowledge and technology development are best described in terms of an "interactive model" and when the implicit social contract between science and society has severely eroded this is not good enough. As we enter the twenty first century U.S. science and technology policy is still searching for a unifying intellectual foundation for with which to confront the issue of the appropriate size of the national public support for research and how the national research resources should be allocated.
As I complete this paper I cannot avoid returning to the question raised by Hughes. Who will supply the public leadership and funding to generate and sustain U.S. techno logical leadership in the future? These concerns are reinforced by the disintegration of a number of major U.S. industrial research laboratories; by the decline in federal support for technology development; and by the growth of institutional barriers to the transmission and diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge.
1.
In Ruttan (2001) I also discuss the role of government in the development of the mass production, agricultural and chemical industries. See also Mowery and Rosenberg (1998) for discussion of the role of government in the development of the commercial aircraft, chemical, electric power and the electronics industries.
2.
In this section I draw primarily on Hughes (1979: 124-161; Hughes (1983); and Reich (1985) . I have also drawn on the revisionist biography by Nye (1983) , and the popular account by Baldwin (1995) .
3. This section draws heavily on Cowan (1990) , MacKerron (1994) , World Energy Council (1993), Hill et al. (1995) , Tester et al. (1991), and Pool (1997) . reactor the coolant is a gas, usually helium or carbon dioxide, and the moderator is graphite," Cowan (1990: 545) . Light water reactors advanced along a politically determined path and by the time other technologies were ready to compete it was too late (Arthur 1990: 541-67) , and Cowan (1990: 541-67) . In retrospect the "path dependence"
was forced by strategic rather than economic considerations. Pool argues that without an atomic weapons program no country would have built uranium-enrichment facilities:
"without the enriched uranium supplied by the post-war bomb building program, it is unlikely that the light water reactor would have been a serious contender much less the design of choice," (Pool 1997: 43) .
6.
A rapid surge in new construction of nuclear plants in the 1960's has sometimes been interpreted as induced by the 1973 oil price shock. Damian (1990: 600) argues, however, that the difficulties encountered by nuclear power were at least partially responsible for the timing of the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1978.
7.
By the late 1990's almost 70% of French electric power production was based on nuclear power. Average plant construction time was a little under 6 years compared to 12 years in the United States. French success can be attributed, in part to the large government subsidies to nuclear power research and development. It can also be attributed to a variety of other factors including standardized design and construction of nuclear plants, greater sensitivity to the issue of oil dependence, and the competence and sophistication needed to manage a technology with high risk potential. The success also reflects a political system in which important technical decisions are made by a bureaucratic-technical elite and the public is excluded from effective participation in such decisions. Nuclear technology development in Japan and South Korea has followed a trajectory similar to that in France (Marcus 1993: 394-395; Ruttan 2001: 265-266 Shurkin (1984: 114-116) . Eckert and Mauchly became involved in a dispute over patent fights with the administration at the University of Pennsylvania and were forced to resign. For a highly personal account of these and related controversies, see Shurkin (1984) .
10.
The SAGE project has been characterized as one of the major learning experiences in technological history (Hughes 1998: 15-67) . The innovations made in connection with the SAGE project at IBM and MIT included (1) techniques to manufacture ferrite core memory rapidly, inexpensively, and reliably, (2) computer-to-computer telecommunications, (3) real-time simultaneous use by many operators, (4) keyboard terminals for man-machine interaction, (5) simultaneous use of two linked computers, (6) ability to devote certain functions to remote locations without interfering with the dual processors, (7) use of display options independently of dual processors, (8) inclusion of an interrupt system, diagnostic programming, and maintenance warning techniques, and (9) associative memory development (Katz and Phillips 1982: 185) . Other IBM 7090 innovations included (1) radically new parallel architecture, permitting several operations to be performed simultaneously, (2) standard modular systems component technology,
printed circuit cards and improved back-panel wiring, (4) an 8-bit byte, (5) greatly improved transistors and the means for manufacturing them, (6) a common mode for attaching peripherals, (7) a combination of decimal and binary arithmetic, and (8) combined fixed and variable word length operations (Katz and Phillips 1982: 189) .
11.
In this section I draw primarily on Mowery (1996) , Steinmueller (1996: 15-52) , and Mowery and Rosenberg (1998 : 1953 -1966 .
12. This characteristic is also responsible for the extreme concern about intellectual property protection on the part of the software industry. Software "piracy" has the effect of driving the price of software to the low marginal cost of its reproduction-too low to cover the costs of software development, Steinmueller 1996: 17).
13.
The structure of the U.S. software industry has been quite different from the structure of the European or Japanese. The European markets are highly fragmented. Most firms tend to specialize in custom software for domestic markets. There are only weak links between industry and universities. It is possible that the development of a more homogeneous European market and common European standards will result in a more international competitive software industry (Malerba and Torrisi 1996: 165-196 
17.
The traditional practice in universities is that faculty members are authorized to spend up to one day a week consulting. Because of the highly decentralized nature of university administration and the frequent complementary relationship between consulting activity and sponsored research consulting activity by university faculty has typically been monitored rather loosely.
18.
In this section I draw on several important studies including Kenny (1986); McKelvey (1996) and Henderson, Orsenigo and Pisano.
19.
In view of the intensive involvement of the private sector pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies in university research since the early 1980's it is somewhat difficult to understand the controversy that greeted the 1999 announcement of a collaborative relationship between Novartus and the University of California-Berkeley.
My own interpretation is that it reflected an increased sensitivity around the issue of the private control of public resources, Rausser (1999) .
20.
In 1980 a decision by the Supreme Court, the Diamond versus Chakrabarty ruling, extended patent protection to new microorganisms. The decision has been interpreted as extending not only to new products of genetic engineering, but to any organism that is found in nature but whose useful products depend on human intervention. The implications of this interpretation became increasingly important in 1991 when Craig
Venter, a biologist at the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH), filed a patent application for 350 unique clones of human genes in order to prevent the private sector from establishing property rights in NIH gene sequences and data bases. In 1998 Venter resigned from the NIH to become the scientific director of a new firm, Celera, established to sequence the human genome in competition with the international pub licly funded Human Genome Project (Ruttan 1992 ).
